Sarbatori fericite si ne vedem pe 3 ianuarie

Impotriva libertatii capitalului financiar

Norma libertatii capitalului financiar a devenit un fel de dogma teologica. Este un exemplu tragic de radicalism intelectual transformat in “bun simt.” Din pacate pentru inaltii prelati ai neoliberalismului financiar, un studiu facut pentru FMI de Anton Korinek de la Universitatea Maryland a demonstrat ca in conditii de informatie imperfecta si volatilitate reglementarile impuse circulatiei capitalurilor financiare sunt, chiar din punct de vedere al teoriei neoclasice, o modalitate de a corecta esecurile pietei si nu o distorsionare a ei. Un munte de studii produse de FMI si NBER arata ca tarile in curs de dezvoltare care au recurs la astfel de limite (Islanda, Brazilia, Coreea de Sud, Chile, Malaezia etc) au trecut mult mai bine de criza decat cele care nu au facut acest lucru.

In aceste conditii in loc de supunere la “logica” altfel destul de greu de descifrat a “pietelor”-a se vedea postarea precedenta-o rezolutie mai responsabila a crizei ar fi constituita de o strategie prin care statele sa reglementeze strict capitalul financiar instituind un regim legislativ comun care sa lase disponibile doar alte planete pentru cei care au ceva de comentat. Argumentul ca procesul politic ar fi dificil si de accea nu merita sa ne batem capul e doar o forma de gandire paralitica. Cu astfel de obiceiuri mentale nu am avea conventii internationale de reglementare a comertului si de pedepsire a comertului cu carne vie.

FMI si austeritatea fara sfarsit

Traim zile demne de o drama dadaista. Elitele politice europene adopta politici sociale brutale pebtru restaurarea încrederii pieţelor financiare în economiile Zonei Euro. Problema e ca pietele nu par sa aiba preferintele explicite atribuite lor de politicieni. O spune economistul-sef al FMI, Olivier Blanchard intr-o interventie “de sarbatori,” in care sustine ca pietele reactioneaza pozitiv cand aud de adoptarea unor pachete de austeritate dar apoi se panicheaza observand ca austeritatea reduce sansele de crestere economica si creste sansele de neplata a titlurilor de stat. Un fel de copil retardat. Iata citatul integral”

“Financial investors are schizophrenic about fiscal consolidation and growth.

They react positively to news of fiscal consolidation, but then react negatively later, when consolidation leads to lower growth—which it often does. Some preliminary estimates that the IMF is working on suggest that it does not take large multipliers for the joint effects of fiscal consolidation and the implied lower growth to lead in the end to an increase, not a decrease, in risk spreads on government bonds. To the extent that governments feel they have to respond to markets, they may be induced to consolidate too fast, even from the narrow point of view of debt sustainability.”

Dupa care dl. Blanchard intra in forma lui de schizofrenie, panicat oarecum de propria descoperire, sustinand ca, totusi, austeritatea trebuie sa continue.

“I should be clear here. Substantial fiscal consolidation is needed, and debt levels must decrease. But it should be, in the words of Angela Merkel, a marathon rather than a sprint. It will take more than two decades to return to prudent levels of debt. There is a proverb that actually applies here too: “slow and steady wins the race.”

Sursa: http://blog-imfdirect.imf.org/2011/12/21/2011-in-review-four-hard-truths/

La calendele grecesti

Cat de mult poate taia Grecia din datorie ramanand in euro si facand tot ce ii spune Comisia Europeana, BCE si FMI, cu vanzari de bijuterii de familie cu tot?
Nu prea mult si, conform FMI, mult mai putin decat se anticipa. Graficul de mai jos arata previziunile facute de FMI in diverse momente asupra datoriei Greciei. Ilustrativ.

Moody’s da o copita “pactului fiscal”

Marele pact fiscal inregistreaza primele reactii din partea “pietelor” pe care vroia sa le “calmeze” (frumoasa antropomorfizarea unui concept care de fapt nu se vrea despachetat). Primul mesaj de amploare este de la Moody’s. Care da scurt din copita:

“Following the EU Summit on 9-10 December, Fitch has concluded that a ‘comprehensive solution’ to the eurozone crisis is technically and politically beyond reach…”

Oops!
Mai departe, Fitch ne anunta ca de retrogradare nu se pregatesc doar suspectii obisnuiti (Italia, Spania, Irlanda) ci si pana acum solidele Belgia si Slovenia, cu Franta in linia de mira. Care o fi motivul asprei agentii? Lipsa de austeritate? Nici pe departe. Este vorba de esenta “pactului fiscal: ”refuzul BCE de a interveni pe post de creditor de ultima instant pentru guvernele zonei euro.

“Of particular concern is the absence of a credible financial backstop. In Fitch’s opinion this requires more active and explicit commitment from the ECB to mitigate the risk of self-fulfilling liquidity crises for potentially illiquid but solvent Euro Area Member States (EAMS).”

Si daca cineva se mai indoieste ca Fitch nu a gasit destula austeritate la Madrid, Dublin etc, raportul o trage apasat, sa inteleaga tot omul:

“Fitch recognises that the policy authorities in all of the countries with sovereign ratings subject to review have embarked upon significant fiscal consolidation and structural reform and these efforts will be taken into account in the review. However, the systemic nature of the eurozone crisis is having a profoundly adverse effect on economic and financial stability across the region and for some EAMS poses near-term risks that are beginning to dominate the sovereign-specific risk fundamentals.”

Dar ce-o fi avand Fitch cu francezul? intreba Moromete. Raspuns: “pactul fiscal” se beazeaza pe fondul de salvare al euro la care Franta este unul din actionarii principali si care, daca ar fi folosit, ar trage in jos credibilitatea Frantei.

“Relative to non-Euro Area ‘AAA’ peers, notably the US (‘AAA’/Negative Outlook) and the UK (‘AAA’/Stable Outlook), the risk from contingent liabilities from an intensification of the Eurozone crisis is greater in light of its commitments to the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM).”

http://ftalphaville.ft.com/

Grafic destept despre cresterea inegalitatii sociale

Natura ideologica a economiei neoclasice: Prelegere la Harvard

Ceausescu-Assad

Scrisoarea mea din Financial Times de azi

Sir, Michael Williams argues that Syria’s president Bashar al-Assad and the late Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceausescu share a similar determination to quell a massive popular protest as well as a mindset that does not allow for the adoption of reforms (“Turkey’s bold stance will seal the fate of Syria’s Ceausescu”, December 14). The comparison is apt but it requires some major qualifications that may explain the survival of Mr Assad’s regime.

While Ceausescu’s personal command over the state’s repressive apparatus simply withered away in a matter of days, after nine months of bloodshed Mr Assad’s army and police were more likely to take their orders and click their heels than to break ranks. Another significant difference lies in the sheer size of the protest: there were hundreds of thousands of anti-regime protesters in Romania in December 1989, while in Syria they are in the tens of thousands at best. As in today’s Syria, ethnic tensions in Romania in 1989 were dramatic and reflected a long history of conflict between the Romanian majority and the Hungarian minority. Yet perhaps at no other point in Romania’s history did these tensions melt into the air so quickly as when the crowds defied machinegun fire and armoured regiments of the kind deployed by Mr Assad during the past nine months.

Vine marea lichidare

Cineva l-a intrebat pe Ken Rogoff care e graficul anului. Il atasez aici. Mesajul de baza: daca istoria are vreo valoare, vine o maree de falimente statale. Mare de tot.Si mai ales in Europa Centrala, si zona euro, zice Ken.

Explicatie: Linia albastra este media datoriei publice globale in raport cu PIB-ul. Spatiul galbel arata numarul de tari in faliment sau in restructurare a datoriei Spatiul roz (he he!) sunt tarile cu inflatie mai mare de 20 la suta (cum ziceam in postarea precedenta, inflatia este un bun fierastrau al datoriei suverane).

Cum sa reducem datoria publica punand la plata sectorul financiar

Cum poate fi redusa datoria unui stat?

Sunt patru optiuni: crestere, austeritate, faliment si inflatie. A cincea optiune este tinuta mai la umbra si se numeste represiune fiscala. Carmen Reinhart, economist la Universitatea Maryland discuta aceasta optiune care ar pune sectorul financiar la plata. Lucrarea pentru BIS (atasata aicireinhart financial repression ).

In sistemul Bretton Woods, dominant pana in anii 70, sistemul financiar era nu numai sever reglementat si, prin urmare, imun la crize, dar era fortat sa contribuie la reducerea datoriilor statelor prin rate mai ridicate, dar totusi moderate, ale inflatiei, credite directionate de stat, si rate ale dobanzii controlate. Suma acestor politici este de fapt un impozit impus sectorului financiar pentru a plati pentru reducerea datoriei statului. In SUA si Anglia postbelica represiunea financiara urca pana la 3 la suta din PIB si a ajutat aceste tari sa reduca cheluielile publice masive facute in timpul razboiului. Departe de a fi epuizata, aceasta strategie este inca folosita in economiile emergente care se pregatesc sa beneficieze de sinuciderea prin austeritate a “Occidentului.”

Iata o baterie de masuri odata perfect respectabile in sistemul capitalist de dinainte de neoliberalism si a caror invocare in contextul actual suna, evident, “socialist.”

Explicit or indirect caps or ceilings on interest rates, particularly (but not exclusively) those on government debts.

Creation and maintenance of a captive domestic audience that facilitated directed credit to the government. This was achieved through multiple layers of regulations from very blunt to more subtle measures. (a) Capital account restrictions and exchange controls orchestrated a “forced home bias” in the portfolio of financial institutions and individuals under the Bretton Woods arrangements. (b) High reserve requirements (usually non-remunerated) as a tax levy on banks (see Brock, 1989, for an insightful international comparison). Among more subtle measures, (c) “prudential” regulatory measures requiring that institutions (almost exclusively domestic ones) hold government debts in their portfolios (pension funds have historically been a primary target). (d) Transaction taxes on equities (see Campbell and Froot, 1994) also act to direct investors toward government (and other) types of debt instruments. And (e) prohibitions on gold transactions.

Mai punem si

(a) direct ownership (e.g., in China or India) of banks or extensive management of banks and other financial institutions (e.g., in Japan) and (b) restricting entry into the financial industry and directing credit to certain industries (see Beim and Calomiris, 2000).